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In this Essay, I ask: Why not require a mandatory CEO term limit? My
purpose is not to advocate a term limit (although, as a stalking horse, I include
a proposal in this Essay), but rather to ask why CEO term limits are out of
bounds - not addressed within the corporate governance scholarship - when
they have long been recommended for directors and, more recently,
implemented for public company auditors.
The traditional answer has been that CEOs are agents of the corporation,
subject to control by the board, which holds primary responsibility for the
firm's business and affairs. Senior officers are largely shielded from outside
interference, permitting them to execute consistent, long-term business
strategies under board oversight. Variations in governance can be privately
ordered among shareholders, directors, and officers, but in most
circumstances, corporate law defers to the board in how it directs the CEO.
Recent regulation has called that deference into question, as private
ordering gives way to a new understanding of how shareholders, directors,
and officers interact. New laws - in particular, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
the Dodd-Frank Act - have begun to regulate director and officer conduct in
response to the real possibility that long-term CEOs can control the board
(rather than the other way around). No doubt, board-CEO relations can vary
from firm to firm, raising concern over the costs of a one-size-fits-all approach
to governance. Nevertheless, in weighing those costs against questions of
board effectiveness, there may still be a shift in how officers are controlled -
including an acceptance of regulation, such as a CEO term limit, that
supplements or supersedes board oversight.
* Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. This Essay is based on the Author's
remarks at the Boston University School of Law conference, The Role of Fiduciary Law in
the Twentieth-First Century: A Conference Inspired by the Work of Tamar Frankel. I
appreciate the thoughtful comments provided by Bernie Black, Deborah DeMott, Ray
Minella, Larry Ribstein, Fred Tung, and David Walker, as well as participants in the
Conference and in the 2010 Southeastern Association of Law Schools Corporate Law
Workshop. I am also grateful to Alysia Fancher, Todd Kornreich, Sung Lee, and John
Siemann for their invaluable research assistance. Any errors are the Author's alone.
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INTRODUCTION
Undercover Boss, a CBS television series, follows CEOs and other
executives as they work incognito alongside staff in their own companies. It is
a show for our times: spanning the divide between America's public and its
most powerful business leaders, who like Mark Twain's King Arthur' must
learn to grapple with the most humbling ofjobs.2
The series also highlights two points that are well-known to corporate law
scholars. First, how well a CEO does her job is critical to how well the firm
performs. Not surprisingly, the series shadows CEOs, not directors. A firm's
success or failure often turns on the CEO's decisions - more so than on deci-
sions of the board.3 Second, CEOs can lose touch with the business. A CEO
can become "stale" over time,4 unable to adapt to a dynamic business environ-
I See MARK TWAIN, A CONNECTICUT YANKEE IN KING ARTHUR'S COURT 211-303 (Oxford
Univ. Press 1997).
2 Fellow employees are told the "new worker" is being filmed for a documentary. See
Adam Cohen, Unreality TV: If the Boss Only Knew, He Would Do Something, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 20, 2010, at Al6; Susanne Craig & Randall Smith, TV's Next "Undercover Boss" May
Come From Wall Street, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2010.
Modem CEOs can wield enormous power over how a company is managed. See
Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries,
46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1597, 1599 (2005); see also Marianne Bertrand & Antoinette
Schoar, Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies, 118 Q. J. ECON.
1169, 1172 (2003) (finding that top managers and different management "styles" signifi-
cantly affect corporate behavior and performance); Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate,
Superstar CEOs, 124 Q. J. EcoN. 1593, 1633 (2009) (finding that increased CEO status
distorts CEO behavior and decreases subsequent firm performance). A firm's CEO is often
more powerful than its Chairman of the Board. See J. Richard Harrison et al., The Changing
of the Guard: Turnover and Structural Change in the Top-Management Positions, 33
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 211, 228-30 (1988) (finding, from empirical studies, that CEOs generally
possess more power than the chairman of the board and often seek to oust the Chairman to
consolidate CEO power); see also John C. Coates IV & Reinier Kraakman, CEO Tenure,
Performance and Turnover in S&P 500 Companies 2 (Eur. Corp. Gov't Inst., Fin. Research
Paper No. 191/2007, 2010), available at http://papers.ssm.com/ sol3/papers.cfin?abstract id
=925532 (describing the structural power dynamic of modem corporations in which non-
CEO board chairs are often prematurely forced out by the CEO so that the CEO can ensure
her position as CEO).
4 See Bruce Walters et al., CEO Tenure, Boards of Directors, and Acquisition
Performance, 60 J. Bus. RES. 331, 337 (2007) (noting that, although companies can benefit
from longer CEO tenure, those benefits are outweighed by the high probability the CEO will
become strategically rigid). Over time, senior managers may also grow increasingly naive
about a company's operations, since important information, especially if it is negative, can
be withheld by lower-level employees who fear retaliation or believe their efforts at
communication will be futile. See Linda Klebe Trevino, Out of Touch: The CEO's Role in
Corporate Misbehavior, 70 BROOK. L. REv. 1195, 1208-10 (2005).
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ment.5  With longevity, however, she can also cultivate close ties with
directors, making it difficult for the board to objectively assess her
performance.6 Board independence can decline, in part because the decision to
retain a CEO gives her leverage she can use to limit future board discretion.7
The result is an increase in agency costs, as CEOs use their longevity to
increase control over the board, potentially benefiting personally at shareholder
expense.8 In particular, as director tenure shortens, 9 a longer-term CEO can
See Andrew D. Henderson et al., How Quickly Do CEOs Become Obsolete? Industry
Dynamism, CEO Tenure, and Company Performance, 27 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 447, 458
(2006) (contending that the obsolescence period for CEOs varies with the dynamics of the
industry); Danny Miller & Ming-Jer Chen, Sources and Consequences of Competitive
Inertia: A Study of the US. Airline Industry, 39 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 1, 3-4 (1994) (noting that
successful CEOs can become complacent over time because they perceive fewer threats to
their power and become wed to strategies and methods that produced past successes). A
survey of 1,925 CEOs found that over half believed they were at their most productive three
to five years after becoming CEO. Only eight percent believed it was between five and ten
years, dropping to two percent after ten years in office. See Jae Yang & Adrienne Lewis,
CEOs Say They're at Their Best After Three Years, USA TODAY, Aug. 24, 2006, available
at http://www.scribd.com/doc/28922302/USA-TODAY-Collegiate-Case-Study-Business-
Leaders (describing a Korn/Ferry International Executive survey).
6 See Sam Allgood & Kathleen A. Farrell, The Effect of CEO Tenure on the Relation
between Firm Performance and Turnover, 23 J. FIN. REs. 373, 389-90 (2000) (using
empirical data to demonstrate the inverse relationship between CEO tenure and turnover
rate); Rick Geddes & Hrishikesh D. Vinod, CEO Tenure, Board Composition, and
Regulation, 21 J. REG. ECoN. 217, 219 (2002); see also Byoung-Hyoun Hwang & Seoyoung
Kim, It Pays To Have Friends, 93 J. FIN. EcoN. 138, 139 (2009) (finding that social ties
between directors and CEOs can significantly increase CEO influence over board
determinations). This is particularly true if the CEO is also Chairman of the Board. See
Vidham K. Goyal & Chul W. Park, Board Leadership Structure and CEO Turnover, 8 J.
CORP. FIN. 49, 65 (2002) (noting that a key function of the board is determining who should
be CEO and that combining the CEO and Chairman positions deprives the board of indepen-
dent leadership to carry out this function).
I See Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Endogenously Chosen Boards of
Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO, 88 AM. EcoN. REv. 96, 97 (1998); see also
infra note 55 and accompanying text.
' See Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the
Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of
Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L. J. 285, 290-92 (2004) (describing how management, including
the CEO, captures the board). CEO pay, for example, increases with tenure, suggesting
growing influence over the board over time. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Lucky CEOs and
Lucky Directors, 65 J. FIN. 2363, 2390-93 (2010) (suggesting that senior managers often use
the grant of opportunistically timed options to control outside board members, particularly
when the company lacks a majority of outside directors or has a long-tenured CEO); James
W. Frederickson et al., A Model of CEO Dismissal, 13 ACAD. MGMT. REv., 255, 258 (1988)
(noting generally that increased tenure usually affords a CEO increased power to co-opt the
board); Charles W.L. Hill & Phillip Phan, CEO Tenure as a Determinant of CEO Pay, 34
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bargain over time for a less independent and more malleable board, further
reinforcing her position within the firm.' 0 The costs to shareholders can be
substantial. An underperforming CEO can cause a substantial drop in share
price and a significant loss of firm value.I'
The principal response has been to strengthen board oversight. Proxy
contests, hostile takeovers, independent directors, concentrated share
ownership, and hedge fund and other activist investors have each been
identified, at one time or another, as the most effective response. 12 None has
directly targeted CEOs. Instead, if board oversight improves, the presumption
has been that CEO performance will also fall into place.13 Yet, the CEO of a
ACAD. MGMT. J. 707, 715-16 (1991).
9 See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
10 See Rende B. Adams et al., The Role ofBoards ofDirectors in Corporate Governance:
A Conceptual Framework and Survey, 48 J. EcON. LIT. 58, 65-67 (2010) (presenting a
survey of the literature on boards of directors, focusing on board actions). The growing
disparity in tenure between CEOs and directors is discussed infra at notes 101-104 and
accompanying text.
I See Lucian A. Taylor, Why Are CEOs Rarely Fired? Evidence from Structural
Estimation, 65 J. FIN. 2051, 2078-80 (2010) (finding that CEO entrenchment makes a board
less likely to dismiss a CEO even though it would maximize shareholder value). An
entrenched CEO, fearing for her job, is also more likely to resist an attractive acquisition
offer. See David S. North, The Role of Managerial Incentives in Corporate Acquisitions:
The 1990s Evidence, 7 J. CORP. FIN. 125, 138, 146 (2001) (noting that the tendency of
managers to resist an acquisition offer is especially noticeable when senior managers own
sizeable blocks of company stock or the company has a long-tenured CEO).
12 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Responses: Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1735, 1741 (2006) (suggesting that the risk of
managerial abuse of its power is limited by the recent increase in shareholder litigation and
the widespread implementation of rules concerning director independence and other
corporate governance matters); Jens Dammann, Corporate Ostracism: Freezing Out
Controlling Shareholders, 33 J. CORP. L. 681, 689 (2008) (noting that the presence of
controlling shareholders, who do not face the same collective action problem as small,
isolated shareholders, subjects managers to increased scrutiny); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise
ofIndependent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: OfShareholder Value and Stock
Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REv. 1465, 1520-40 (2007) (explaining that greater indepen-
dence among directors resulted from a shift in primary corporate objectives to shareholder
value and greater informativeness of stock market prices); Robert W. Hamilton, Corporate
Governance in America 1950-2000: Major Changes but Uncertain Benefits, 25 J. CORP. L.
349, 353-64 (2000) (describing how several recent developments, including the rise of
institutional investors and leveraged buyouts, have worked to reform American corporate
governance); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEx. L. REv. 987, 995-
1037 (2010) (chronicling the movement towards increased board independence and the
beneficial effects on shareholder value).
13 See JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE - PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES
BROKEN 52-53 (2008); see also Adams et al., supra note 10, at 69-74 (surveying literature
[Vol. 91: 12631266
WHY NOTA CEO TERMLIMIT?
large firm - by virtue of her position as CEO - can, and often does, enhance
her own authority. 14 Although subject to fiduciary duties,15 she has substantial
discretion within broad limits to consolidate and reinforce her position -
potentially at corporate (and shareholder) expense. 16 Thus, even as board
scrutiny has increased' 7 and average CEO tenure has dropped,' 8
underperforming CEOs, on average, have still been able to keep their jobs:
only about 2 to 2.25 percent of CEOs at large U.S. corporations are forced out
each year,"9 a rate that is lower than what would occur among well-functioning
on board assessment of the CEO).
14 See Jens Dammann, How Embattled Are U.S. CEOs?, 88 TEX. L. REv. SEE ALSo 201,
206-07 (2010), http://www.texaslrev.com/seealso/vol/88/responses/dammann (using the
ubiquity of poison pills during the 1980s as an example of managers' tendency to employ
new devices or strategies to blunt the potential loss of CEO influence or job security);
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Architecture of American Corporate Law: Facilitation and
Regulation, 2 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 167, 170-76 (2005) (noting that top managers, due to
their influence and control, are more likely than ordinary agents to increase power at the
principal's expense).
1s See Johnson & Millon, supra note 3, at 1605-11; Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True
Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk's Solution for Improving
Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1759, 1762 (2006).
16 See Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 170-7 1.
17 See Chuck Lucier et al., The Era of the Inclusive Leader, STRATEGY + Bus., Summer
2007, at 12 (explaining how increased board engagement and active shareholder
involvement have combined to limit CEO discretion).
'1 See Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette Minton, How Has CEO Turnover Changed? 2
(Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W12465, Aug. 2008), available at
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/steven.kaplan/research/km.pdf (finding that average CEO
tenure has dropped to just under six years). Global performance-related turnover is also
reportedly on the rise. See Gordon, supra note 12, at 1531-32. A recent Booz Allen study
reports that globally, among the 2,500 largest public companies, performance-related CEO
turnover in 2006 was 4.6 percent. See Lucier et al., supra note 17, at 4. Note, however, that
the same Booz Allen study found that the average tenure of North American CEOs in 2006
was 9.8 years, the longest since 1995. See id at 5.
' See Dirk Jenter & Fadi Kanaan, CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation
2, 18 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12068, 2006), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl2068.pdf (providing empirical analysis of CEO turnover
rates at 2,548 firms from 1993 to 2001); Kaplan & Minton, supra note 18, at 23. Estimating
the rate of firings is difficult, since firms may not disclose the precise reason why a CEO has
stepped down. See Jenter & Kanaan, supra, at 18; see also infra note 85 and accompanying
text. Moreover, they may not include CEOs who choose to sell the company rather than
face the risk of an unfavorable board evaluation. See Coates & Kraakman, supra note 3, at
16-17. Nevertheless, the projected CEO firing rate, in the absence of CEO entrenchment, is
substantially greater than actual rates, even taking into account departures that mask actual
terminations. See Taylor, supra note 11, at 2054.
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boards.20 CEOs, instead, often are fired only after an extended period of poor
performance. 21
In this Essay, I pose a question at the heart of CEO authority: If agency
costs increase with tenure, why not require a mandatory CEO term limit? My
purpose is not to propose a CEO term limit, but rather to ask why term limits
for CEOs are out-of-bounds when they have long been advocated for others.
Director term limitS2 2 are increasingly common,23 and public company auditors
20 See Taylor, supra note 11, at 2053 (contending that CEO entrenchment limited the
willingness of boards to fire poorly-performing CEOs even though dismissal would have
maximized shareholder value). Among other reasons, directors are unlikely to terminate a
CEO if doing so violates corporate norms. See Taylor, supra note 11 at 2052-53, 2083, 2085
(suggesting that adherence to the industry norm relates to the general distaste of many
directors for firing CEOs). Director reluctance may also be due, in part, to ties with the
CEO or the directors' interest in being nominated to other boards. See Hermalin &
Weisbach, supra note 7, at 98-99. There is some indication that independent directors
"behave differently" than inside directors when deciding whether or not to replace a low-
quality CEO, but the incremental turnover effect is relatively small. See Sanjai Bhagat &
Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm
Performance, 54 Bus. LAW. 921, 924-26 (1999).
21 See Jerold B. Warner et al., Stock Prices and Top Management Changes, 20 J. FIN.
ECON. 461, 487-88 (1988) (noting that, even in the face of a string of poor performances,
management is often absolved of factors the board deems outside of management's control);
see also Jenter & Kanaan, supra note 19, at 36. In fact, for most CEOs, poor performance
does not constitute a basis for just-cause termination. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S.
Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives
Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 249 (2006) (finding, from an analysis of 375
CEO employment contracts, that less than four percent of CEO contracts listed
incompetence as grounds for just-cause termination). More recently, some CEOs have been
pushed out due to concerns over prospective performance - after boards and activist
investors questioned the CEO's ability to perform well in the future. See Lucier et al., supra
note 17, at 11.
22 Calls for director term limits have gone on for almost twenty years. See, e.g., Martin
Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance, 48 Bus.
LAW. 59, 68 (1992) (suggesting that the imposition of term limits for independent directors
would ensure that a nominally independent director would not fall under senior manager
influence).
23 See USC/CENTER FOR EFFECTIVE ORG., HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, OTH ANNUAL CORP.
BOARD EFFECTIVENESS STUDY 2006-2007, at 12 (2006), available at http://www.
boardmember.com/Article Details.aspx?id=1431 (noting that twenty-two percent of
companies surveyed in 2007 had term limits for directors, more than double the number in
2000). Although Institutional Shareholder Services does not affirmatively recommend the
adoption of director term limits, its general policy is to "scrutinize boards where the average
tenure of all directors exceeds fifteen years for independence from management and for
sufficient turnover to ensure that new perspectives are being added to the board."
RISKMETRICS GROUP, 2010 U.S. PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES SUMMARY 18, 22 (2010),
available at http://www.issgovernance.com/files/RMG_2010_US SummaryGuidelines201
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are required to be rotated - in effect, a term limit - every five years.24 The
question, sometimes raised in the popular press, 25 has largely escaped
academics - a noticeable gap, in light of the vast amount of scholarship on
CEO entrenchment. 26
The answer, at first glance, is fairly straightforward. U.S. corporate law
strives to strike a balance between managers' discretion in running a business
and their accountability to shareholders. Within that framework, CEOs are
agents of the corporation, subject to control by the board, which has primary
responsibility for overseeing the firm's business and affairs. 27 Senior officers,
therefore, are largely shielded by the board from outside interference,
permitting them to execute consistent, long-term business strategies without
close external scrutiny. Variations in governance can be privately ordered
00225.pdf.
24 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 203, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(j) (2006); see also Robert
Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A
Morality Tale for Policymakers Too, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 251, 262-63 (2005) (providing a
general description of the Sarbane-Oxley ACT's (SOX's) requirements concerning a
company's use and rotation of independent auditors).
25 See, e.g., Thomas W. Harvey, Been a CEO for Ten Years? Your Time's About Up,
Bus. INs., Apr. 16, 2007, at 11; Barbara Kellerman, CEO Term Limits, WASH. POST, May
26, 2009, http://views.washingtonpost.com/leadership/panelists/2009/05/ceo-term-limits.
html; Steve Mader, CEO Term Limits, FORBES, Nov. 14, 2006, available at http://www.
forbes.com/2006/11/14/leadership-governance-boardroom-lead-ceo-cxbh_11 14termlimits.
html; Mike Myatt, Should CEOs Have Term Limits?, N2GROWTH.COM (Feb. 3, 2011),
http://www.n2growth.com/blog/ceo-term-limits.
26 The only academic paper of which I am aware that analyzes the question of CEO term
limits is Matthias Benz & Bruno S. Frey, Corporate Governance: What Can We Learn from
Public Governance?, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 92, 97-98 (2007). Other papers have drawn
parallels between CEOs and presidents, but have not considered the question of term limits.
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Executive Power in Political and Corporate Contexts, 12 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 277, 282-84 (2010) (describing similarities between the modem CEO and
the U.S. President). I exclude mandatory retirement policies from my analysis of CEO term
limits. Firms often consider sixty-five years to be the normal retirement age for senior
executives, including the CEO - to assist in better planning CEO successions, rather than to
address entrenchment. See Murali Jagannathan & Yee Cheng Loon, Why Do CEO
Retirement Policies Affect Firm Value? 1-4 (Dec. 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.
cfm?abstract id=1536588.
27 See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 774 n.570 (Del. Ch.
2005), aff'd 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). The principal that officers are agents of the
corporation, and not agents of the board only, is well-established. See, e.g., JOSEPH K.
ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE
162-63 (1832); see also I THOMAS W. WATERMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS OTHER THAN MUNICIPAL 169-70 (1888).
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among shareholders, directors, and officers, but in most circumstances,
corporate law defers to the board in how it directs the CEO.2 8
Recent regulation, however, has called that deference into question. Federal
law has long regulated discrete aspects of corporate governance, 29 but regu-
lating a firm's internal affairs - the relationship among its shareholders,
directors, and officers - has traditionally been left to the states. 30  That
separation is eroding. New laws, principally at the federal level,31 directly
regulate director and officer conduct 32 - moving beyond the "enabling" feature
of state corporate statuteS33 to draw bright-line rules around corporate conduct
that encroach on substantive areas traditionally beyond federal reach. 34 No
doubt, part of the shift was a reaction to the corporate scandals of the late
1990s and, more recently, the financial crisis that began in 2007. However, the
shift also reflects the real possibility that long-term CEOs can control the board
(rather than the other way around)35 - requiring a change in the standard
28 See infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
29 See Robert S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William 0. Douglas: The Securities and
Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 80
(2005) (noting that federal regulations concerning corporate governance usually are
confined to specific issues or practices implicated by high-profile scandals).
30 See Sean J. Griffith & Myron T. Steele, On Corporate Law Federalism: Threatening
the Thaumatrope, 61 Bus. LAW. 1, 4-6 (2005); see also infra notes 43-51 and accompanying
text.
1' See Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REv. 588, 591-92 (2003)
(noting that, in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom scandals, the federal government has
brought fundamental issues relating to corporate governance under federal regulation); see
also Griffith & Steele, supra note 30, at 1-2.
32 See William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American
Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small
State, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 953, 959, 973 (2003). Those new laws are described infra at notes
58-71 and accompanying text.
3 See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law,
109 HARv. L. REv. 1911, 1921 (1996) (describing state enabling laws as a series of default
rules from which the parties can contractually deviate); John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM.
L. REv. 1618, 1626-27 (1989) (highlighting the need, on the part of legislators, courts, and
academics, to strike the proper balance between mandatory and enabling laws in modern
corporate statutes).
34 See Chandler & Strine, supra note 32, at 973-76; Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A.
Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND.
L. REv. 859, 886 (2003) (contending that SOX expressed Congress's clear intention to
regulate the conduct of corporate officers as it relates to the duties of care, loyalty, and good
faith).
3 See Johnson & Millon, supra note 3, at 1613-22; see also infra notes 52-57 and
accompanying text.
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framing of the firm, as the traditional conception of how shareholders,
directors, and officers interact gives way to a new understanding of that
relationship.
Board-CEO relations, of course, can vary from firm to firm, raising concerns
over the costs of a one-size-fits-all approach to corporate governance. A key
question is whether a mandatory requirement, even if detrimental for some
firms, would benefit the economy as a whole. There are important benefits to
a system that permits oversight to vary based on the particular requirements of
each individual firm. Yet, there is also a risk that a CEO, by virtue of her
ability to influence the board, will throw off control altogether. That tension is
at the heart of the recent trend in corporate governance. The new approach
continues to rely generally on the board to oversee senior managers, but also
reflects a shift in how officers are controlled - including a growing acceptance
of regulation that supplements or supersedes traditional board oversight. 36
Part I describes the traditional deference that corporate law gives to the
board in managing the CEO, as well as the more recent federal regulation of
how directors and CEOs interact. The new approach reflects the ability of
long-term CEOs to significantly influence the board and limit effective
oversight. Part 11 then introduces - solely as a stalking horse - what a CEO
term limit could look like, assesses the key strengths and weaknesses of such a
limit, and considers whether evolving attitudes toward regulating corporate
activity may prompt change in how CEOs are managed. This Part also raises
the possibility that new regulation, such as a CEO term limit, may begin to
take the place of traditional deference to the board.
I. REGULATING CEOS
A basic tenet of U.S. corporate law is that the board controls the firm. 3 7 The
board oversees the firm's business and reviews its financial objectives, major
plans, and auditing and accounting principles. 38 As companies have grown,
the board has also become responsible for appointing professional managers -
specialized experts who devote their time solely to running the firm and its
36 See infra notes 118-130 and accompanying text.
3 See E. Norman Veasey, Corporate Governance and Ethics in the Post-Enron
WorldCom Environment, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 839, 842 (2003) (arguing that boards
should actively engage in developing and executing the company's strategic business plan);
see also Strine, supra note 15, at 1770. Almost 150 years ago, one court concluded, "[t]he
president and directors of a bank, instead of being mere servants, are really the controlling
power of the corporation, - the representatives, standing and acting in the place of the
interested parties. . . . The directors derive all of their power and authority from the charter
and laws, and none from the stockholders." Goodspeed v. The E. Haddam Bank, 22 Conn.
530, 540-41 (1853).
3 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 14 1(a) (2010); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.02 (1994).
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business.39 Thus, in addition to performing other high-level duties, the board
selects, compensates, reviews, and where appropriate, replaces senior
executives,40 delegating to the CEO and others, as fiduciaries, the authority to
act on the company's behalf.41 Many directors limit their involvement in the
business to advising senior managers, directly managing only in times of crisis
or during significant developments affecting the company and its affairs, but
otherwise leaving day-to-day decisions to the CEO and her team.42
Interfering with the director-officer relationship can be costly to firms and
shareholders. It can dilute the benefits of centralized management43 and
discourage innovation, entrepreneurism, and beneficial risk-taking." Interfer-
ence can also compromise the ability of shareholders, directors, and officers to
privately order their own affairs, which they typically do through the firm's
charter and by-laws and by contract, 45 thus potentially imposing a less-
efficient, less-flexible, one-size-fits-all model of corporate governance on
39 See Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for
Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REv. 387, 393-94 (2003)
(contending that separating legal and equitable interests was crucial in bringing together
skilled managers and establishing long-term relationships between the company and its
suppliers and customers); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership
and Control, 26 J.L. & EcON. 301, 301-09 (1983) (noting that vesting the power to make
corporate decisions in some group other than the residual risk claimants permits a degree of
specialization that is ultimately beneficial). Alfred Chandler described the contribution of
managerial hierarchies to the rapid U.S. business expansion of the mid-1800s in ALFRED D.
CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS
6-8 (1977).
40 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 38, at § 3.01.
41 See id. § 3.01; see also Johnson & Millon, supra note 3, at 1601-02, 1605-08. As
Joseph Angell and Samuel Ames described in the first comprehensive U.S. treatise on
corporate law: "The power of electing both officers and members ... [is] incident . . . to
every corporation," a power that was naturally vested in the shareholders, but "could be
taken from the body at large, and reposed in a body or directors, or any other select body."
See ANGELL & AMES, supra note 27, at 63; see also CHARLES T. BOONE, A MANUAL OF THE
LAW APPLICABLE TO CORPORATIONS 184-85 (1882).
42 See MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 38-40 (1971); MACEY, supra
notel3, at 53-54.
43 See Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1745-46.
" See Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why
Importing U.S. Corporate Law Isn't the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1055, 1101-02
(2004).
45 See id. at 1077-78; see also David F. Larcker et al., The Market Reaction to Corporate
Governance Regulation 1 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Gov't at Stanford Univ., Working Paper
Series No. 82, Oct. 14, 2010) (forthcoming J. FIN. ECON.), available at http://papers.
ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1650333.
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organizations with vastly different needs and characteristics. 46 In light of the
potential drawbacks, corporate law has provided little affirmative direction as
to what officers must do. Instead, it has shielded them from direct shareholder
influence,47 invested in them a great deal of discretion,48 and deferred to the
board, as the firm's plenary authority, in overseeing their conduct.49 The
board, consequently, has two principal functions - to oversee the firm's affairs,
and perhaps more importantly, to monitor senior managers and remove poor
performers.50 If shareholders are unhappy with the outcome, the remedy is to
vote out the board or simply sell their stock.51
The foregoing presumes that boards monitor and control the CEO. In fact,
the opposite has often been more accurate, with CEOs exercising significant
control over the board and its decision-making process. 52 For example, until
recently, CEOs strongly influenced - if not controlled - board composition,
often causing directors to feel a keen sense of loyalty toward senior
managers. 53 The rapid rise in CEO pay over the past thirty years can also be
explained, in part, by the CEO's influence over the board.54 In some cases,
46 See Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L.
REv. 733, 748-49 (2007) (contending that overly stringent corporate governance regulation
threatens to antagonize the relationship between the board and management and limits the
board's ability to effectively monitor senior managers); see also Chandler & Strine, supra
note 32, at 978-81; Strine, supra note 15, at 1763.
47 See Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1735 (contending that the modern corporation is
partially defined by the decision to limit the power and influence of shareholders and instead
choosing to grant primacy to the board); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing
Shareholder Power, 118 HARv. L. REv. 833, 844-46, 848 (2005) (suggesting that the extent
to which U.S. corporate law limits the shareholders' ability to manage or intervene in
corporate affairs distinguishes it from the corporate law of most other developed countries).
48 See Strine, supra note 15, at 1762.
49 See MACEY, supra note 13, at 51-52; Thompson & Sale, supra note 34, at 886. So
ingrained is the director-officer relationship, U.S. courts have found for at least 150 years
that any attempt by an outsider to remove an officer would be "an improper exercise of ...
authority. The officers . . [are] the private agents of the company .... [R]emoval ... is a
right which belongs to the corporation alone." Neall v. Hill et al., 16 Cal. 145, 149 (1860).
50 See MACEY, supra note 13, at 53-55.
5' See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 698 (Del. Ch. 2005),
aff'd 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) ("The redress for failures that arise from faithful management
must come from the markets, through the action of shareholders and the free flow of capital,
and not from this Court."); Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1749-51; Strine, supra note 15, at
1764; see also supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
52 See MACE, supra note 42, at 72-85, 190-94; Johnson & Millon, supra note 3, at 1613-
20 (describing de facto officer control of the corporation).
5 See Gordon, supra note 12, at 1496.
5 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 6, at 2390-93; Lawton W. Hawkins, Compensation
Representatives: A Prudent Solution to Excessive CEO Pay, 72 BROOKLYN L. REV. 449,
2011] 1273
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
directors were also "captured" by the CEOs they selected - associating with a
CEO's decisions, feeling responsible for the results and, consequently,
becoming less willing to remove her.55 Board control eroded as directors
deferred to CEOs in setting objectives, strategies, and policies. 56 That decline
in control, in turn, hampered the board's ability to monitor the CEO on behalf
of shareholders.57
Corporate scandals in the 1990s and, more recently, the financial crisis that
began in 2007 prompted a federal regulatory response. Much of the new
regulation bypasses corporate law's traditional deference to the board and
instead - by requiring managers to undertake certain tasks and, in some cases,
certify their compliance - manages important aspects of how directors and
officers interact.58
First, new regulation has enhanced the role of independent directors. 59 The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) requires a public company to establish an
audit committee comprised of independent directors, 60 as do New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ Stock Market (NASDAQ) regulations. 61
453-54 (2007); Kahan & Rock, supra note 12, at 1036-37; Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter,
CEO Compensation 1 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Gov't at Stanford Univ., Working Paper Series
No. 77, Nov. 2010), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=1582232 (surveying recent literature on CEO compensation and finding managerial
power and market competition to be important, but not exclusive, determinants).
5s See MACEY, supra note 12, at 58-61; Langevoort, supra note 6, at 294-95.
56 See MACE, supra note 42, at 41-42. In addition, board decisions are typically based on
company-prepared data, which a CEO can color in favor of the projects she supports. See
Rende B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, A Theory of Friendly Boards, 62 J. FIN. 217, 217-19
(2007) (noting that a CEO has an incentive to withhold information from the board because
the more that is provided, the greater the probability of board intervention in the decision-
making process).
5 See MACEY, supra note 13, at 57; William H. Donaldson, Chairman, Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, Remarks at the 2003 Washington Economic Policy Conference, National
Association for Business Economics (Mar. 24, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/spch032403 whd.htm.
See Chandler & Strine, supra note 32, at 979-80.
5 See Gordon, supra note 12, at 1482-83, 1538-40 (noting that the increased emphasis
on director independence not only relates to board composition but also more rigorous
standards of independence).
60 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2006).
61 See NASDAQ, Inc., Stock Market (NASDAQ) Rule 5605(c)(2)(A) (2009); NYSE,
Inc., Listed Company Manual (NYSE Manual) § 303A.07(b) (2004). The definitions of
"independence" vary between NASDAQ and NYSE. Compare NASDAQ Rule 5605(b)(1)
with NYSE Manual § 303A.01-.02. NYSE also requires each listed firm to create indepen-
dent compensation and nominating committees, see NYSE Manual § 303A.04-.05, and
NASDAQ requires a nominating or compensation committee, if one is formed, to consist
entirely of independent directors, see NASDAQ Rule 5605(d)-(e).
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Both NYSE and NASDAQ further require a majority of directors to be
independent 62 and independent directors to regularly conduct their own
separate meetings.63 In addition, prompted by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank),64 the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted new Rule 14a-11,65 requiring public
companies to include in their proxy materials the director nominees of
qualified shareholders for up to twenty-five percent of the board.66
Second, new regulation has shaped CEO incentives by mandating new
compensation arrangements.67 SEC disclosure requirements rely on public
scrutiny to compel firms to develop pay practices that link compensation to
long-term performance. 68 In addition, Dodd-Frank requires each public firm to
62 See NASDAQ Rules 5605(a)(2), 5605(b)(1); NYSE Manual § 303A.01.
See NASDAQ Rule 5605(b)(2); NYSE Manual § 303A.03.
* See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 971, 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n).
65 Implementation of new Rule 14a- 11 has been stayed pending the outcome of litigation
that has challenged its adoption. See Order Granting Stay of Commission's Facilitating
Shareholder Director Nominations Rules, SEC Release No. 9149 (Oct. 4, 2010), available
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2010/33-9149.pdf.
66 See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668 (proposed
Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, 249).
67 Congress earlier turned to the tax code to influence executive pay practices, but with
only limited success. See David 1. Walker, The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term
Focus of Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L. REv. 435, 451-53 (2010). The Internal Revenue Code
limits the tax deductibility of non-performance-based pay to senior executives to $1 million
annually. I.R.C. § 162(m) (West Supp. 2010). It also restricts corporate tax deductions for
excessive payments under a "golden parachute" executive severance package, as well as
imposes excise taxes on the recipients. See id. § 280G; I.R.C. § 4999 (2006).
68 See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158,
53,160 (Sept. 8, 2006) (to be codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R.). The firm's proxy
statement must also include a detailed narrative of the objectives and design of its
compensation program, including how compensation is determined. In addition, it must
include a summary compensation table that sets out a dollar value for each item, as well as
total compensation for each of the firm's five senior executives. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402
(2009). Dodd-Frank also directs the SEC to adopt rules that require each public firm to
disclose the relationship between its executives' compensation and the firm's financial
performance. See Dodd-Frank § 953(a), 124 Stat. at 1903-04 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78n). Public firms, in addition, must disclose the median of annual total compensation of all
employees (other than the CEO), the annual total compensation of the CEO, and the ratio of
those two amounts. See id. § 953(b), 124 Stat. at 1903-04 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
781). Dodd-Frank also directs stock exchanges to require listed companies to create
independent compensation committees to assess the firm's compensation consultants and
other committee advisers. See id. § 952(a), 124 Stat. at 1900-01 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j-3).
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hold a periodic non-binding shareholder vote ("say-on-pay") on the
compensation paid to top executives. 69
Third, new regulation has defined portions of the CEO's job, rather than
leaving such decisions to the firm's discretion. Pursuant to SOX, CEOs must
now supervise, assess, and certify the firm's internal controls, irrespective of
what their earlier responsibilities might have been. 70 SOX and Dodd-Frank
also modify executive employment contracts. Listed firms must implement
policies that claw back incentive-based executive pay if erroneous reporting
occurs that requires the issuer to restate its financial statements. 71
The result has been a shift in corporate governance - from a deference that
"does not lightly deprive the stockholders' chosen representatives of
managerial authority"72 to a new set of rules that "prescribe the precise means
by which directors and officers are to pursue certain ends."73 Changes in
regulation are likely to persist.74 Although the shift is too recent to be strongly
predictive, future proposals may include separating the CEO and Chairman of
the Board positionS75 and implementing a range of CEO pay requirements that
69 Companies must also provide for a shareholder vote no less frequently than every six
years on a separate resolution to determine whether the say-on-pay vote will take place
every one, two, or three years. See Dodd-Frank § 951, 124 Stat. at 1899-1900 (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1). In addition, as part of any vote to approve a merger,
acquisition, or other strategic transaction, the firm must disclose and hold a non-binding
shareholder vote on transaction-related compensation that senior executives will receive (a
"golden parachute"). See id The SEC has adopted final "say-on-pay" rules in accordance
with Dodd-Frank's requirements. See Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation
and Golden Parachute Compensation, 76 Fed. Reg. 6010 (Feb. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249).
70 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 302, 404, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7241, 7262 (2006).
7' 15 U.S.C. § 7241; Dodd-Frank § 954, 124 Stat. at 1904 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §
78j-4).
72 Chandler & Strine, supra note 32, at 979.
7 Id.
74 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 12, at 1041-42 (noting that, even when a company
retains the ability to roll-back recent voluntary reforms, it is unlikely to do so due to a desire
not to antagonize shareholders).
7 See COMMISSION ON PUBLIC TRUST AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE, THE CONFERENCE
BOARD, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - PART 2: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 21 (Jan. 9,
2003), available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/757.pdf. Globally, non-Chairman
CEOs have an average tenure of 5.6 years, whereas the tenure is 10.3 years when the
positions are combined. See Lucier et al., supra note 17, at 48. The percentage of
companies splitting the CEO and Chairman positions has increased significantly. According
to a Spencer Stuart survey, forty percent of S&P 500 companies had a separate Chairman
and CEO in 2010, up from twenty-three percent in 2000. See SPENCERSTUART, 2010
SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 20 (25th ed. 2010), available at
http://www.spencerstuart.con/articleview-zmags.aspx?id=85b7e8fc; see also Kahan &
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mandate certain types of compensation, perhaps tied to restricted stock.76
Regardless of outcome, however, what is apparent is that the traditional
deference to the board has begun to wear away. The willingness, through new
federal standards, to directly regulate director-CEO relations suggests that
change is more likely today than in the past.
I. CEO TERM LIMITS
CEOs typically possess significant discretion in performing their jobs. That
discretion can be used to enhance their authority, potentially at shareholder
expense. 77 Recent history suggests that many have done just that. 8 A
mandatory term limit would help level the playing field; CEOs could no longer
be assured of holding a special franchise. It could, however, also inject a
costly requirement into the traditional director-officer relationship. To help
illustrate the potential benefits and drawbacks, a basic term limit proposal is
sketched out below:
Firms whose shares trade publicly on a national securities exchange
would be required to introduce a CEO term limit. Doing so would be
consistent with the use of listing requirements to set independence
standards for listed company boards. 79 States considering a CEO term
limit would face a collective action problem, as those choosing to impose
a requirement would potentially lose corporations, and their income, to
states choosing not to do so. 80 By targeting listed firms, the new
Rock, supra note 12, at 1030.
7 See Walker, supra note 67, at 455-56 (outlining different proposals, put forward by the
U.S. Treasury Department, judges, academics, and practitioners, that would require some
minimum percentage of an executive's compensation to be paid in restricted stock). More
recently, executive compensation proposals have also focused on the role of inside debt on
corporate managers. See Frederick Tung & Xue Wang, Bank CEOs, Inside Debt
Compensation, and the Global Financial Crisis 3-5 (Emory Pub. Law Research, Paper No.
10-98, Mar. 13, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=1570161.
n See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
71 See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
" NYSE, for example, requires most boards to consist of a majority of independent
directors, as well as requiring them to establish audit, nominating, and compensation
committees consisting entirely of independent directors. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 12,
at 1022-23.
so The agency divide between shareholders and managers may result in sub-optimal
levels of regulation among the states. Managers may choose a regime that does not ade-
quately protect shareholder interests. See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A
Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2369 (1998) (excluding
broker-dealer regulation from a proposed competitive state-level regime in light of agency
problems between owners and customers). A similar point about individual firms that may
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requirement would also focus on companies with the most dispersed
shareholders and, therefore, those most likely to have the greatest agency
costs.,,
* The CEO would be selected by the board, remain subject to continuing
board oversight, and be removable by the board at any time during her
term in office. Generally, directors are better able than shareholders to
assess a CEO's performance and the actual causes of any (rise or) decline
in firm value. 82 A board is also more likely than any individual
shareholder to take account of the interests of shareholders as a whole in
making business-related decisions. 83
* Upon being selected, the CEO would remain in office for a specified
period of time, to be determined by the board, but no greater than the
time period permitted by the listing requirement. The outer limit could
be set at six years, consistent with the current average CEO tenure. 84 A
six-year limit is also in line with a recent study indicating that many
CEOs who "retire" during their first six years in office have, in fact, been
fired.85
choose to adopt a CEO term limit is discussed infra at note 122 and accompanying text.
81 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305, 309, 344-45 (1976).
82 Shareholders often lack sufficient information on which to make informed decisions,
such as separating firm performance from industry and market effects. Consequently, firms
tend to rely on authority-based decision-making structures in lieu of direct shareholder
oversight. See KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LiMITS OF ORGANIZATION 68-70 (1974). Note,
however, that CEOs - in particular, underperforming CEOs - are more likely than before to
be removed following poor firm performance, even when firms in the same industry have
also declined, suggesting that a board's assessment of CEO performance may not
completely filter out the influence of industry and market shocks. See Jenter & Kanaan,
supra note 19, at 1, 5, 33-34 tbl.8.
83 See Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits ofShareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REv. 789,
792-98 (2007); Ray Fisman et al., Governance and CEO Turnover: Do Something or Do the
Right Thing? 3-5 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 05-066, 2005), available at
http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/05-066.pdf.
84 See Kaplan & Minton, supra note 18, at 2. A six-year limit would also be generally
consistent with CEO estimates of their own effectiveness. See Yang & Lewis, supra note 5.
Note, however, that a recent Booz Allen study found that the average tenure of North
American CEOs in 2006 was 9.8 years, the longest since 1995. See Lucier et al., supra note
17, at 5.
85 See Coates & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 16-17, 25-26 (extrapolating, from empirical
data, that many CEOs, especially those in their fourth or fifth year as CEO, will choose to
voluntarily resign or sell the company rather than face a formal dismissal by the board). For
a discussion of whether founder CEOs should be treated differently, see infra note 118.
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The analysis of a CEO term limit is informed, in part, by the U.S. debate
over term limits for public officials.8 6 There are, of course, significant
differences between CEOs and politicians, and so one must tread carefully in
analogizing the two.87 Yet, to the extent a CEO term limit addresses similar
concerns - potential entrenchment and abuse of power - the scholarship on
public term limits may be helpful.88
Beginning with Thomas Jefferson, proponents have favored term limits to
keep public officials in check, limit the risk of tyranny, and ensure the
continued vitality of the chief executive. 89 Any resulting loss of power, they
have argued, is likely to be offset by other perks of the job, so it would
continue to attract the best candidates. 90 Those arguments have parallels in the
corporate world. A term limit would directly address problems of CEO tenure
by periodically introducing a new CEO with a fresh perspective on the job.91
86 See James Fanto, Whistleblowing and the Public Director: Countering Corporate
Inner Circles, 83 OR. L. REV. 435, 513 n.239 (2004).
87 See M. Todd Henderson, The Nanny Corporation, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1517, 1556-57
(2009) (noting that CEOs are subject to a more constant evaluation, through changes in a
firm's market price, compared to politicians who are elected at fixed intervals); Strine,
supra note 15, at 1763-64 (noting that the most salient difference is that citizens cannot
diversify away the risks of poor or incompetent politicians, but investors can diversify the
risk that company management will adopt sub-optimal business strategies by investing in
multiple companies).
88 See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 807 (1983) (noting that
courts, in considering the scope and character of fiduciary law, have analogized fiduciary
relations with other functionally similar relationships - such as that between union officials
and union members). Arguments for and against director term limits may also be relevant,
although there are important differences between a director's role and a CEO's. See supra
notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
89 See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 171-
72 (1967) (discussing the potential for tyranny in viewing representatives as "independent of
the people" and arguing that representation should shift with the composition of the
population); GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 243-46
(1992); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 310-11, No. 62, at 333 (James Madison) (J.R.
Pole ed., 2005); JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION IN THE AGE OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 28-30 (1989); Thomas Jefferson, Letter to the Vermont Legislature
(Dec. 10, 1807), in THE EVOLVING PRESIDENCY 76-77 (Michael Nelson ed., 3d ed. 2008).
More recently, term limit proponents have argued that long-serving legislators, assured of
being re-elected, can become captured by special interests rather than represent the populace
at large. See Linda Cohen & Matthew Spitzer, Term Limits, 80 GEO. L.J. 477, 479-81
(1992); Steven F. Huefner, Term Limits in State Legislative Elections: Less Value for More
Money?, 79 IND. L.J. 427, 434 (2004).
90 See Elizabeth Garrett, Term Limitations and the Myth of the Citizen Legislator, 81
CORNELL L. REV. 623, 626 (1996).
1 A similar argument has been made in favor of director term limits. See Charles M.
Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, The Enron Failure and Corporate Governance Reform, 38
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More frequent CEO turnover is associated with a significantly higher level of
innovation.92 In addition, new CEOs can "clean house," 93 restructuring a
lower-performing company 94 and writing down 95 and selling poorly-
performing operations.96 Knowing she will step down, a CEO is also less
likely to hold a proprietary interest in her office.97 Directors, instead, would
periodically consider new CEO candidates, both within and outside of the firm,
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 855, 882 (2003) (describing institutional investors' rationale for
director term limits).
92 See Frederick L. Bereskin & Po-Hsuan Hsu, New Dogs New Tricks: CEO Turnover,
CEO-Related Factors, and Innovation Performance, EUR. FIN. MGMT. (forthcoming 2011)
(manuscript at 3), available at http://efinaefm.org/OEFMSYMPOSIUM/Toronto-201 1/
papers/bereskin.pdf (finding, from an empirical analysis of CEO turnover data, that
innovation - as defined by a company's patent counts and patent citations - increased over a
three-to-five-year period following a change in CEO).
9 Although evidence is mixed on the impact of inside and outside successors, the
consensus is that forced CEO turnover improves corporate performance. Compare Rakesh
Khurana & Nitin Nohria, The Performance Consequences of CEO Turnover 23-26
(Working Paper, 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-219129 (reporting that the
forced departure of a CEO with an outside successor improves company performance,
whereas an inside successor has no effect), with Wei Shen & Albert A. Cannella, Jr.,
Revisiting the Performance Consequences of CEO Succession: The Impacts of Successor
Type, Postsuccession Senior Executive Turnover, and Departing CEO Tenure, 45 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 717, 728-29 (2002) (finding that forced senior executive turnover improves firm
performance when successors are insiders, but is detrimental in cases of outside succession).
94 See David J. Denis & Diane K. Denis, Performance Changes Following Top
Management Dismissals, 50 J. FIN. 1029, 1030 (1995).
95 See Kevin J. Murphy & Jerold L. Zimmerman, Financial Performance Surrounding
CEO Turnover, 16 J. ACCT. ECON. 273, 312 (1993); John S. Strong & John R. Meyer, Asset
Writedowns: Managerial Incentives and Security Returns, 42 J. FIN. 643, 659 (1987) (noting
that the most important determinant of a firm's decision to announce a writedown is whether
it has recently changed senior management). The writedown of assets, and reduction in
income, may be driven by a new CEO's interest in reducing reported results during her first
year, followed by an increase in earnings in the subsequent year. See Strong & Meyer,
supra, at 644; see also Susan Pourciau, Earnings Management and Nonroutine Executive
Changes, 16 J. AcCT. & EcoN. 317, 334 (1993).
96 See Michael S. Weibach, CEO Turnover and the Firm's Investment Decisions, 37 J.
FIN. ECON. 159, 186 (1995) (noting that CEO turnover often results in divestitures of poorly
performing assets in an attempt to reverse managerially-motivated acquisitions).
1 See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REv. 1209, 1271-75
(1995) (noting that property rights in management positions are problematic because they
incentivize managers to act contrary to shareholder interests). In addition, a mandatory term
limit would override any contractual assurances of continued employment a CEO could
negotiate with the board. See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 21, at 246-47 (describing the
tendency of CEOs to contract around at-will termination clauses in employment contracts
through the use of definite-term employment agreements).
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creating a deep bench of potential successors. Among those interested in a
public firm,98 the pay, power, and prestige of being CEO would still be likely
to attract the best candidates. 99 The resulting benefits to shareholders would be
tangible: stock prices typically run up after the announcement of a new CEO,
so long as the transition is anticipated, orderly, and fully disclosed to the firm's
investors.100
Some have argued that public term limits weaken the President's power
relative to Congress. The President is subject to term limits - thus facing a
"lame duck" problem toward the end of her second term - while members of
Congress are not.101 Interestingly, in the corporate context, this concern may
provide another argument in favor of a CEO term limit. As director term limits
become more common,102 there is a growing likelihood that CEO tenure will
lengthen relative to the board's - the mirror image of the President and
Congress. Evidence suggests that an increase in relative tenure corresponds to
greater influence.103 A CEO's compensation, for example, is significantly
higher if the CEO was appointed before the chair of the board's compensation
committee. 104 Thus, the need for a CEO term limit could be driven, in part, by
an increasing reliance on director term limits. Over time, as board tenures
9 CEO candidates may choose to work in private firms and so avoid the risk of a short-
term tenure. A similar interest in positions at firms that were taken private arose following
the passage of SOX. See Emily Thornton, Going Private: Hotshot Managers Are Fleeing
Public Companies for the Money, Freedom and Glamour of Private Equity, Bus. WK., Feb.
27, 2006, at 52.
" See Langevoort, supra note 6, at 297. Successful CEO candidates are also more likely
to believe they will do an exceptional job, and therefore, as described more fully in the
additional condition relating to term extensions set forth below, see infra notes 105-111 and
accompanying text, expect to continue on as CEO even after the initial six-year period has
ended. See Langevoort, supra note 6, at 299-302.
"00 See Randoph P. Beatty & Edward J. Zajac, CEO Change and Firm Performance in
Large Corporations: Succession Effects and Manager Effects, 8 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 305,
313, 316 (1987); see also Lucier et al., supra note 17, at 48-49. Note, however, that there
has been little empirical support for a relationship between director term limits and a firm's
financial performance or risk. See Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J.
CORP. L. 887, 902 (2007) (describing a report, issued by Institutional Shareholder Services
in November 2006, in which it concluded there was no link between a company's policies
regarding director term limits or a mandatory retirement age and performance).
"01 See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably
Expands and Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. REv. 505, 520 (2008).
102 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
103 See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
'" See Brian G.M. Main et al., The CEO, the Board of Directors and Executive
Compensation: Economic and Psychological Perspectives, 4 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 293,
323 (1995). Moreover, longer-term CEOs can influence director selection, creating a strong
sense of loyalty to the CEO. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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continue to decline, directors may be placed at a disadvantage relative to
longer-tenured CEOs.
The arguments against public term limits were first framed by Alexander
Hamilton. A mandatory term limit, in Hamilton's view, would force needless
change in leadership. The public would also lose the benefits of the most
experienced leaders.105 Those concerns apply equally to a mandatory CEO
requirement. To address them, a proposal could include the following
additional provision:
Upon completion of her six-year term, the board could elect to nominate
the CEO for an additional term in office. That term would be shorter
than the original six years - perhaps three years - and CEOs would again
be eligible for re-election at the end of each successive period. For her to
remain as CEO, she would need the affirmative vote of fifty percent of
the outstanding shares. A retiring CEO would not be barred from
becoming a CEO or director of another company.
Requiring shareholder approval would be consistent with the trend toward
greater shareholder influence over corporate managersl 06 - evidenced, in part,
105 See THE FEDERALIST No. 72, at 388-89 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005).
A similar argument has been made in connection with director term limits. See Clark, supra
note 24, at 274-75.
106 See Kahan & Rock, supra note 12, at 1039 (discussing how institutional investors and
hedge funds have made it more difficult for CEOs to insulate the corporate agenda from
investor influence). There is a possibility, under this arrangement, that large shareholders
could begin to dominate the day-to-day management of the firm. In France, for example,
for a majority of firms, shareholders can revoke the appointment of the board of directors
(conseil d'administration) at any time. See Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Corporate
Governance: The State of the Art and International Regulation, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 22, 32
n. 181 (2011). In addition, the shareholders can remove the prdsident directeur g6ndral
(PDG), who is also conseil president, acts as the CEO, and traditionally has decided who
else will be on the board. See Brian R. Cheffins & Bernard S. Black, Outside Director
Liability Across Countries, 84 TEX. L. REv. 1385, 1452 (2006). Large shareholders,
therefore, can control how the firm is managed, either directly through control of the PBG
and the board or indirectly by threatening to remove the firm's senior managers. See Martin
Gelter, The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Managerial Autonomy and Stakeholder
Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 129, 156-58
(2009) [hereinafter Gelter, Dark Side]. The German system, by contrast, is intended to
insulate managers from direct shareholder oversight. Under a two-tier structure, the
management board is controlled by a supervisory board, which can only terminate a
management board member for cause and with a vote of no-confidence by the shareholders.
Supervisory board members, in turn, are selected by the shareholders, but can only be
terminated with a three-quarters vote. Managers, therefore, are insulated from shareholder
control, although large shareholders are still able to influence how the firm is managed. See
Martin Gelter, Tilting the Balance Between Capital and Labor? The Effects of Regulatory
Arbitrage in European Corporate Law on Employees, 33 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 792, 835-38
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by the new proxy access rule107 and "say-on-pay" voting requirement.108
Directors would continue to have primary control over the CEO through their
ability to terminate her or not extend her term. By requiring shareholder
approval, however, the board's decision would more likely accord with
shareholder interests than if made by the board alone. 109 A majority voting
requirement would give shareholders an inexpensive means to remove the
CEO - by simply withholding their votes so that the majority requirement is
unmet.110 The rise of institutional shareholder activists and the prominence of
proxy advisory firms would also act as a check against CEO dominance of the
re-election process. 11
(2010). No doubt, a CEO term limit would permit greater direct oversight by controlling
shareholders. Under this Essay's proposal, shareholders could vote on whether or not to
extend a CEO's term. The board, however, would also continue to oversee senior managers
and retain the right, on its own, to terminate the CEO. Consequently, while greater
shareholder control of the CEO would be possible, the board would remain actively
involved in overseeing CEO performance. Moreover, concentrated share ownership is less a
characteristic of the United States than of Western European countries like France and
Germany, see Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance:
Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1645-50 (2006),
suggesting less of a controlling influence by shareholders over U.S. corporate management
than in those countries, see Gelter, Dark Side, supra, at 176.
107 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
108 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
109 See Bebchuk, supra note 47, at 869-70.
110 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REv. 675,
703 (2007) (discussing the practice of withholding votes in director elections and its
equivalence to voting against a candidate); Kahan & Rock, supra note 12, at 1020-21.
Individual shareholders are unlikely to gather information if the cost of doing so outweighs
the benefits. See Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 1745-46 (explaining why a rational
shareholder often lacks incentives to gather the information necessary to participate in
corporate matters in an informed manner). Shareholders, however, could gather information
about a CEO's performance at relatively low cost, based on her prior six-year track record,
and rely on that information in casting their votes.
I See Stephen Choi et al., The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY
L.J. 869, 905-06 (2010) (discussing the significance of voting recommendations issued by
proxy advisory services); Kahan & Rock, supra note 12, at 995-1007. It is also possible that
greater shareholder oversight will have little direct effect on CEO selection. In the United
Kingdom, directors who are also senior managers of the company (referred to as "executive
directors") are employed by the firm pursuant to service contracts, see STEPHEN GIRVIN ET
AL., CHARLESWORTH'S COMPANY LAw 384 (18th ed. 2010), typically on an annual basis, see
FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, REVISIONS TO THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE
(FORMERLY THE COMBINED CODE) 4 (2010), available at http://www.frc.org.uk/images/
uploaded/documents/May%20201 0%20report%20on%2OCode%20consultation.pdf
Notwithstanding the shareholders' ability to vote out an executive director, only nineteen
directors (executive and non-executive) from nine companies on the FTSE All Share Index
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Reflecting another of Hamilton's concerns, a term limit could also cause
CEOs to become short-sighted - maximizing returns in the short term and
passing longer-term problems on to a successor. 12 Concerns of this kind,
however, are not new to the corporate world. CEOs are often criticized for
pursuing short-term gains at the expense of long-term share value.113 The
problem, therefore, would likely result as much from an existing bias toward
short-term outcomes as from a mandatory term limit. 114 One response has
been to craft compensation to better align shareholder and manager interests.115
A CEO's wealth can be tied to the long-term outcomes of her performance -
for example, by awarding restricted stock that a CEO must hold after she
(approximately ninety-eight percent of the U.K. market capitalization, see FTSE All Share
Index Factsheet, FTSE.CoM, http://www.ftse.com/Indices/UK Indices/Downloads/ FTSE_
All-ShareIndexFactsheet.pdf) lost a vote between 2000 and 2009. See FIN. REPORTING
CouNCIL, supra. The U.K. example, therefore, may indicate that increased control by
shareholders will not significantly affect the outcome of CEO selection. Note, however, that
although U.K. shareholdings are more dispersed than in France or Germany, see supra note
106, share ownership in the United Kingdom has historically been more concentrated than
in the United States. Part of the U.K. model, therefore, may be driven by the ability of large
shareholders, through coordinated action, to implicitly influence how firms are managed.
Accordingly, for U.K. firms, the need for explicit control - for example, by voting out a
managing director - may also be less important than in the United States. See Gelter, Dark
Side, supra note 106, at 186-90. Note, however, that institutional share ownership of the
largest 1,000 U.S. public companies has increased significantly in recent years, from forty-
six percent in 1987 to seventy-three percent in 2009. See THE CONFERENCE BOARD, THE
2010 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT REPORT: TRENDS IN ASSET ALLOCATION AND PORTFOLIO
COMPOSITION 27 tbl.13 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=1707512&. Like the U.K. model, the rise of U.S. institutional shareholders may
also limit the need for explicit control.
112 Hamilton was concerned that, with a term limit, a chief executive would have little
incentive to pursue longer-term projects whose benefits accrue to her successors, opting
instead to focus on short-term plans and individual gains. See THE FEDERALIST No. 72,
supra note 105, at 387-88; see also Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 89, at 492-94, 510-11;
David A. Crockett, "An Excess of Refinement": Lame Duck Presidents in Constitutional
and Historical Context, 38 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 707, 713-14 (2008). Recent
commentators have similarly argued that, by inducing rapid turnover, legislators have less
interest to work cooperatively with others, focusing instead on personal and special
interests. See Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 89, at 508; Crockett, supra, at 712.
113 See, e.g., John R. Graham et al., Value Destruction and Financial Reporting
Decisions, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Nov.-Dec. 2006, at 27, 31 (reporting, from a survey of nearly
400 senior managers, that managers are more than willing to alter investment decisions for
the sake of hitting short-term earnings targets).
114 See Kent Greenfield, Reclaiming Corporate Law in a New Gilded Age, 2 HARV. L. &
POL'Y REV. 1, 12-13 (2008) (describing the tendency of CEOs to engage in corporate
downsizing solely to inflate stock prices).
"5 See Walker, supra note 67, at 467-71.
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leaves office.116 Retiring CEOs also would have an incentive to manage for
the longer term in order to maintain their reputation if they planned to later
seek office at another firm. Moreover, even with a term limit, CEOs may be
interested in longer-term results if re-election remains a possibility.11 7
Capping CEO employment, of course, would be costly for some firms. By
directly addressing tenure, and its associated problems, it would also be
valuable for others. A key question is whether a mandatory requirement, even
if detrimental for some, would benefit the economy as a whole.' For every
Steve Jobs (Apple's CEO)' 19 that could be lost, a CEO term limit would ensure
116 See Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing
and Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 363 (2009); Walker, supra note
67, at 468-70.
117 Hamilton argued that if a president could not stand for re-election, there would be
little else to positively influence her behavior while in office. See THE FEDERALIST No. 72,
supra note 105, at 388.
"I Jeff Gordon has raised a similar question about the costs and benefits of imposing
independent director requirements on public firms. See Gordon, supra note 12, at 1469.
There is, in addition, the question of whether founders should be treated differently. Eleven
percent of the largest public U.S. firms are headed by its founder. See Rildiger Fahlenbrach,
Founder-CEOs, Investment Decisions, and Stock Market Performance, 44 J. FIN. & QUANT.
ANAL. 439, 439 (2009). A number of studies indicate that founder CEOs have a positive
effect on corporate performance, including outperforming successor-CEO firms with respect
to firm valuation, investment behavior, and stock market performance. See, e.g., Ronald C.
Anderson & David M. Reeb, Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance:
Evidence from the S & P 500, 58 J. FIN. 1301, 1303 (2003); Fahlenbrach, supra, at 439-41;
Lerong He, Do Founders Matter? A Study of Executive Compensation, Governance
Structure and Firm Performance, 23 J. Bus. VENTURING 257, 257-58 (2008); Daniel L.
McConaughy et al., Founding Family Controlled Firms: Efficiency and Value, 7 REv. FIN.
ECON. 1, 2 (1998). A founder-run firm, therefore, may not incur the same agency costs as a
non-founder firm. In addition, founders may choose not to go public in order to avoid
becoming subject to a mandatory term limit requirement. Thus, notwithstanding the
potential benefits of a CEO term limit, there is an open question whether such a requirement
should apply equally to founder CEOs. One possibility is to exclude founder CEOs from a
term limit requirement. Doing so, however, implies that founder CEOs are less likely to
engage in self-serving behavior than non-founder CEOs, which is unlikely to always be the
case. An alternative would be to require founder CEOs, like others, to rely on the
possibility of re-election at the end of their term. See supra notes 105-111 and
accompanying text. Founder CEOs, in that case, would need to take into account a
mandatory term limit in deciding to access the public market, just as they would need to
consider the other costs and benefits of doing so. See Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K.
Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital
Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 231, 255-57 (2008) (discussing the costs and benefits of
accessing the public capital market).
"' See Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Steve Jobs Is the No. 4 "Wealth Creator",
CNNMONEY.COM (Dec. 20, 2010, 5:51 PM), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2010/12/20/steve-
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a review and vote by shareholders of a Jimmy Cayne (Bear Steams' former
CEO). 120 But, if term limits are valuable, why have shareholders not imposed
them directly? One answer may be that CEO-dominated boards are reluctant
to adopt a mandatory requirement. In a company with dispersed shareholders,
power already resides with the board, which therefore may have little incentive
to reduce the CEO's role.121 Another answer may be that shareholders would
face a collective action problem if they tried to impose a term limit on their
own. Faced with two equal opportunities - but one with, and the other
without, a term limit - an attractive CEO candidate is likely to pick the
unrestricted office. Thus, for shareholders, the cost of individual action may
be prohibitive. Even if a CEO term limit is the better outcome, it is unclear
how the transition would occur. Mandating a term limit for all CEOs would
minimize that cost.122
The more intriguing question is why CEO term limits never entered the
corporate governance debate in the first place. The answer historically lies in
the traditional deference given to directors. U.S. corporate law has tended to
balance two sometimes-competing interests: the directors' interest in leeway to
steer the firm, and the shareholders' interest in ensuring the firm is run for their
benefit. On balance, it has tended to favor managerial discretion - reflecting
the concern that tying down the board could hurt firms (and shareholders) and
limit overall economic growth. 123
jobs-is-the-no-4-wealth-creator/ (highlighting Jobs' thirty-one-place jump in the 2010 Chief
Executive magazine rankings).
120 See William D. Cohan, The Rise and Fall of Jimmy Cayne, CNNMONEY.COM (Aug.
25, 2008, 3:39 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2008/07/31/magazines/fortune/riseandfall
Cayne cohan.fortune/index.htm (describing how Cayne, as CEO of Bear Steams, "had not
changed; the world around him had").
121 See Oliver Hart, Corporate Governance: Some Theories and Implications, 105 ECON.
J. 678, 687 (1995) (providing theoretical frameworks for corporate governance and applying
them to proposals for reform).
122 Similar problems and solutions face voters in public elections. See Einer Elhauge,
Are Term Limits Undemocratic?, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 83, 86, 114-21 (1997). It is, of course,
also possible that a CEO term limit would simply result in a less efficient governance
structure and a decline in shareholder wealth. See infra notes 131-132 and accompanying
text.
123 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA
L. REv. 1, 31-33 (2002) (conceding that discretionary authority within the modem
corporation creates agency costs, but that those are outweighed by the significant benefits of
doing so); Black & Kraakman, supra note 33, at 1920-21 (contending that corporate law
should be context-specific, since uniform rules may prohibit the use of critical managerial
discretion to adapt to changing needs and conditions); see also supra notes 43-46 and
accompanying text. Managers who can eschew short-term thinking in favor of longer-term
projects potentially benefit society by supporting non-investor constituencies like employees
and the communities in which they do business. See Strine, supra note 15, at 1769.
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New regulation reflects a changing approach to governance. Not content to
rely on boards alone, Congress - as evidenced by SOX and Dodd-Frank - has
begun to regulate areas traditionally left to director discretion, including
compensationl 24 and job descriptions.125 Corporate governance now includes
affirmative requirements, imposed by regulation, which the CEO must satisfy.
Perhaps, therefore, we are entering a crossroads - a time when it is
appropriate, based on the realization that boards cannot always control CEOs,
to consider how much of the CEO's role should be regulated from the outside.
Balanced against heightened regulation are the benefits of the traditional
board-CEO relationship, which remains fundamentally private. There are - for
both the company and society - important benefits to insulating the CEO from
external oversight or universal standards.1 26 The risk is that, given too much
discretion, an entrenched CEO will throw off control altogether.127 That
tension is at the heart of the recent trend in corporate governance. New
regulation has targeted specific CEO functions, but continues to rely generally
on the board to oversee senior managers. A CEO term limit, therefore, may be
most effective within a management framework that combines both.128
None of the foregoing is intended to suggest that boards have abandoned
their monitoring responsibilities. To the contrary, recent well-known examples
include the forced resignations of Douglas Ivester (Coca-Cola)129 and Robert
Nardelli (Home Depot).o3 0 A mandatory term limit, however, would ensure
that all public company CEOs are subject to a minimum level of scrutiny. The
result would be a system, consistent with SOX and Dodd-Frank, that maintains
primary control with the board, but more directly regulates the most
problematic aspects of the CEO function. That balance may, in turn, more
closely reflect today's understanding of how shareholders, directors, and
officers interact.
124 See supra notes 67-69, 71, and accompanying text.
125 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
126 See Strine, supra note 15, at 1769; see also supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
127 See supra notes 16, 52-57, and accompanying text.
128 Striking a balance between control and discretion is a key ingredient for ensuring the
corporate form can adapt to changes in the environment. See Katharina Pistor et al., The
Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 791,
796 (2002) (finding that the historical challenge of corporate law has been to develop a set
of rules that permit the flexibility necessary for businesses to thrive while, at the same time,
controlling agency costs).
129 See Betsy Morris & Patricia Sellers, What Really Happened at Coke, FORTUNE, Jan.
10, 2000, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortunearchive/2000/01/
10/271736/index.htm.
130 See Parija B. Kavilanz, Nardelli Out at Home Depot, CNNMONEY.COM (Jan. 3,
2007), http://money.cnn.com/2007/01/03/news/companies/home depot/index.htm.
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CONCLUSION
This Essay has considered the evolving regulation of CEOs - a shift from
deference to the board to more direct, external control - by analyzing a
mandatory CEO term limit. An external requirement, like a term limit, would
have had no place within the traditional framing. Yet, direct regulation of the
CEO may be increasingly possible as corporate governance evolves.
Perhaps, however, a CEO term limit goes too far. The decline in average
CEO tenure suggests that CEO power is already on the wane, making
additional regulation unnecessary, in particular as momentum from recent
changes continues to limit CEO authority. 131 Moreover, in a recent study,
proposals to cap or regulate executive pay, increase shareholder access to the
company's proxy statement, and eliminate staggered boards were viewed by
shareholders, on the whole, as value-decreasing.132 Consistent with such
findings, new regulation has targeted only discrete aspects of the CEO's job
and has been much less intrusive than a mandatory cap on tenure.
Yet, as history has shown, a CEO is able to use her position within the firm
to enhance her own status. Precisely because the average tenure has dropped,
now may be the best time - with the least resistance - to implement a market-
wide term-limit requirement that extends to all public firms, including those
whose CEOs' terms have not declined. In addition, as director tenures
continue to shorten, longer-term CEOs may begin to use their relative
longevity to their own personal advantage, potentially at shareholder expense.
Equalizing terms in office may be necessary simply to level the playing field.
The costs of doing so can be prohibitive - and, at this stage, those costs are
difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, as perceptions of the corporation continue
to evolve, the benefits of a CEO term limit - or other regulation that minimizes
the costs of tenure - may increasingly favor a new approach.
" See Kahan & Rock, supra note 12, at 1051.
132 See Larcker et al., supra note 45, at 4-6 (empirically finding that proposed new
corporate governance regulation would negatively affect shareholder wealth).
1288 [Vol. 91: 1263
